Afghanistan: where the poppies blow | Editorial

Off By Sharon Black

The poppy no longer blooms so readily in the Flanders fields that are in our minds at this time of remembrance. But its lethal cousin is prospering as never before in the fields of Helmand

Because of the impact of modern weedkillers, the poppy no longer blooms so readily in the Flanders fields that are in our minds at this time of remembrance. But its lethal cousin is prospering as never before in the fields of Helmand.

It is a dismal irony that the little red flower that became a symbol of sacrifice in the first world war should now also be a symbol of the failure to control the opium trade in Afghanistan.

The UN Office on Drugs and Crime reports this week that poppy cultivation there has reached a record level. The area under poppy cultivation is 36% higher than in 2012, and more than three times as high as in 2006.

After years of military work to create the necessary security, millions to encourage farmers to change crops, and billions on supporting the Afghan government, it is worse than when Britain first came. Much worse.

The failure is not Britain’s alone, of course. But, under the 2001 Bonn agreement, Britain took responsibility for the national counter-narcotics programme, and in Helmand after 2006 we were in charge in the worst province for poppy-growing. Why did we fail in these tasks?

There are three sets of explanations. The immediate reasons include programmes that were inadequately co-ordinated or spottily executed. Free wheat seed was handed out for a while, for example, and then, as aid funds shrank, was suddenly less available.

Cotton seed was distributed, but the farmers could not sell the cotton at a fair price. The Afghan army, which used to provide guards for eradication teams, stopped doing so in some areas.

The intermediate reason, at the national level, is that revenue from the drugs trade is a source of funds for virtually all political actors, on both the Taliban and government sides. An even greater source, however, has been foreign aid that has been diverted or stolen.

As we prepare to withdraw, that aid is shrinking, which makes money from drugs more important. So poppy planting is increasing and collusion in the trade growing. Stolen aid, drugs and corrupt dealing in legal commodities have all fuelled the conflict, much as diamonds have driven war in parts of Africa.

It was pretty ambitious to tackle the poppy trade with a few brigades and civil aid teams, and optimistic to imagine it could be done without tackling the complicity of warlords, governors and ministers.

But even if the anti-opium campaign had been pursued more radically, there is a final strategic reason why it would have fallen short. The drugs trade is global, demand is strong and supply shifts from one region or country to another. Ending it requires a global approach, with simultaneous attention to both users and growers in every part of the world.

Still, we could have made a better fist …read more